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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to expand on the existing literature covering Latin American 
economic reform through a new take on the state/opposition relationship that accounts for 
the differences in neoliberal consolidation in Chile and Argentina. More specifically, it 
identifies the management tactics employed by the state to diminish anti-neoliberal 
mobilizations and how these tactics adjust over time with changes in government. This 
thesis isolates and analyzes the consistency of state opposition management tactics across 
various administrations and its effect on the consolidation of a stable neoliberal model. In 
Chile, consistency in management tactics across successive governments has fostered the 
consolidation and stability of their neoliberal model. Conversely, in Argentina, the 
strength of the neoliberal model has suffered greater alterations due to the inconsistency 
in opposition management tactics used by the Kirchner administrations when compared 
to previous governments. 
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When a military junta took control of Chile from President Salvador Allende in 
1973, the new bureaucracy soon began a process of neoliberal reform. The slow, far-
reaching project transformed the Chilean economy, setting the country on a path of 
stable, consistent economic growth that continued for the next several decades. Chile has 
become a showcase for the effects of neoliberal reform and a model for positive growth 
both in Latin America and the world. Argentina embarked on its own process of 
neoliberal reform in the early 1990s, which sparked a short-term rise in growth for the 
country. However, the road has not been so smooth for Argentina, which has since 
experienced a rollercoaster of positive and negative growth in annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) over the next few decades.1 While the liberalizing changes have taken 
hold and endured in Chile, the changes in Argentina have not found a solid base and have 
been more elusive in producing economic stability.  
Radical structural adjustment projects like the ones undertaken by Chile and 
Argentina create pockets of both support and opposition among various interested groups. 
Opposition groups, in particular, often seek to reverse the neoliberal policies put in place 
in an effort to reduce its negative effects. In other words, these groups want to weaken the 
economic model that the state wishes to impose. Several questions become immediate: 1) 
How does the battle between these two poles affect the long-term strength of the 
neoliberal project? 2) What tactics are employed by the state to manage opposition 
groups? 3) Do changes in government and tactics affect the trajectory of the neoliberal 
process? 
Contention to reform can have a large effect on how well the state can focus on 
and implement new policies. Opposition groups can affect the structure and purpose of 
policies while diverting attention and resources from leadership reform goals. Sustained 
mobilization of contentious groups and state tactics in response may determine how well 
the state can solidify the reform process and stabilize the new economic path. This study 
                                                
1 “World Databank,” The World Bank, accessed May 22, 2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=true#. 
 2 
will endeavor to compare the political and economic history of Chile and Argentina since 
each country began neoliberal reform to determine how opposition management tactics 
by the state affect the course of the neoliberal process and the resulting strength of its 
economic structure. 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to expand on the existing literature covering Latin 
American economic reform through a new take on the state/opposition relationship that 
accounts for the differences in neoliberal consolidation in Chile and Argentina. More 
specifically, it identifies the management tactics employed by the state to diminish anti-
neoliberal mobilizations and how these tactics adjust over time with changes in 
government. This thesis isolates and analyzes the consistency of state opposition 
management tactics across various administrations and its effect on the consolidation of a 
stable neoliberal model. 
This study works under the assumption that reforms, policies, and institutions 
associated with neoliberalism help the political and economic system absorb shocks, both 
external and internal, in order to achieve economic growth in terms of GDP. As such, the 
form of Chilean and Argentine neoliberal models likely affects the trajectory of each 
country’s economic growth, however, the causal effects of this relationship is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Instead, this study seeks to explain the variances in adjustments to 
the neoliberal structures of each country due to deviations in the state/opposition 
relationship. 
A study of this type is important for various reasons. In the context of today’s 
global economy, countries around the world are constantly opening and closing their 
markets for reasons that depend on each nation’s interests and domestic situation. As 
these processes evolve, presenting case studies allows decision makers the opportunity to 
evaluate their own nation against the case studies to find free market policies and 
methods that might be successful. In this spirit, this comparative analysis of the Chilean 
and Argentine cases may teach policymakers about productive economic policies and the 
effects of opposition to those policies. What will the addition or adaptation of new or 
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existing institutions truly mean for the economy and society? What unforeseen side 
effects to the domestic economy may arise from a new trade agreement? How will 
interest groups react? Whether working individually or in concert, these opposition 
groups present a challenge to the goals of the state when implementing policy changes. 
Studying the lessons provided by others’ experiences helps one avoid the same mistakes 
or hardships. 
A comparison of Chile and Argentina in terms of economic growth will further 
supplement current comparative studies of this nature. Certainly, the endgame of current 
research is attempting to identify direct causes of growth in order to provide some policy 
guidance for decision makers, who, by nature of the process, are feeling in the dark. 
When discussing the effects on the economy by improving institutions, Rodrik posits 
“cross-national studies…are just the beginning that point us in the right direction.”2 This 
study may help to understand the trajectory of economic growth when reform occurs in 
the presence of opposition forces. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The most important problem raised in this study is how opposition management 
tactics by the state account for the differences in consolidation of reform policies and 
strength of the neoliberal model experienced by Chile and Argentina after embarking on 
neoliberal reform. To answer this question, I analyze the different processes of neoliberal 
reform and the effects of the relationship between the state and opposition groups for 
both countries. The goal is to identify what factions of opposition were present in each 
country during attempts at reform, the management tactics used by the state in response 
to these factions, and how these factions impacted the reform process.  
First, this thesis reviews the trends of current literature on the subject of 
opposition to neoliberal reform and the implementation strategies of neoliberalism taken 
by the state. It individually addresses Chilean and Argentine case studies along these 
lines and provides in-depth analysis of their economic trajectories. Within these case 
                                                
2 Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” NBER Working Paper no. 9305 
(February 2004): 23. 
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studies, the consistency of state actions in response to contentious movements across time 
is examined. State actions are applied to opposition groups from the international and 
domestic business elite, worker union organizations, and civil society. For the purpose of 
this thesis, discussions of civil society encompass any individual not affiliated with the 
business elite or unions. Specifically, the poor, unemployed, and informal workers fall 
into this group. Empirical evidence and data is provided through the use of primary and 
secondary sources. 
The dependent variable is the consolidation of a stable and strong neoliberal 
model in each country. The dependent variable is measured against adherence to accepted 
definitions of orthodox neoliberal principles. The independent variables are the types of 
tactics employed by the state to manage opposition to neoliberal reform and the 
consistency of those tactics’ use across successive governments. Thus, the effects of 
management tactics and consistency on the adjustment of the neoliberal models in Chile 
and Argentina are analyzed. 
The main argument developed is that consistency in applying management tactics 
to deal with opposition groups is a major factor in the maintenance of a stable, strong 
economic model. After its implementation during the military dictatorship, the neoliberal 
model in Chile sustained very few major adjustments through the consistency of actions 
across several administrations. By contrast, Argentina’s neoliberal model has experienced 
several adjustments to its primarily orthodox structure because the most recent two 
presidential administrations have altered the tactics used by previous governments to 
address neoliberal opposition. 
In order to fully develop this main purpose, a definition of neoliberalism and its 
underlying principles is required. Neoliberalism calls for a minimalist state and is 
embodied in the generally accepted Washington Consensus, which contains a list of 
desirable policies to guide nations toward economic development.3 The rationality for 
countries turning to neoliberalism lies in the freeing up of capital to be used by the 
                                                
3 John Williamson, “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development,” in 
Development Challenges in the 1990s: Leading Policymakers Speak from Experience, ed. Timothy Besley 
and Roberto Zagha (Washington, DC  : New York: World Bank  ; Oxford University Press, 2005), 33. 
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market in its natural course.4 At their heart, neoliberal principles are each aimed at 
regaining capital mobility from the constraints of the state and regulatory institutions. As 
a result, this newly freed capital is expected to create an environment of increased 
production, competition, and economic growth. Conversely, structures that are created 
that purposely channel or control the flow of capital are viewed by neoliberal supporters 
as introducing inefficiencies in market operation and detract from the economic model.5 
Examples of these detrimental structures include a large state presence through regulatory 
agencies, barriers to trade, nationalized businesses, and price controls. Liberalization of 
the labor market is also viewed as freeing up capital from rigid institutions through the 
assumption that businesses will have more flexibility to adjust to market forces and 
compete in their sector. For the purpose of this thesis, the strength of the neoliberal model 
in Chile and Argentina is measured against the growth of state regulation in terms of 
trade barriers, nationalization, price controls, and influence of unions against the 
flexibilization of labor. Where these factors are increased, the consolidation of the 
neoliberal model is considered decreased and less stable. 
 
                                                
4 Andrew Gamble, “Neo-Liberalism,” Capital & Class 25, no. 3 (January 2001): 131. 
5 Eva A. Paus, “Economic Growth through Neoliberal Restructuring? Insights from the Chilean 
Experience,” The Journal of Developing Areas 29, no. 1 (October 1994): 32. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Economic reform of any kind often faces the problem of winners and losers 
during the transition from the old system to the new. Groups that have a vested interest in 
the direction and outcome of these reforms can come in many shapes and forms. Often, 
the success of radical economic reform, such as the neoliberalism undertaken by Chile 
and Argentina, can be strongly influenced by the presence of these strong interest groups 
that contend the reforms in order to maintain the status quo. Those that seek to retain the 
old system play a vital role in the formation of the new system although this largely 
depends upon access to or influence on policymaking decisions the political system 
provides them. 
Thus, the relationship between the state and opposition groups is crucial to the 
development and consolidation of an economic neoliberal system. Much of the existing 
literature revolving around the politics of economic reform in Latin America and, by 
extension, the role of opposition groups falls into two camps: 1) the actions of the state to 
impose the neoliberal agenda upon the nation and 2) the creation and mobilization of 
anti-neoliberal actors. The scholarship in these areas are extensive and varied, however, a 
shortfall exists in the development of the relationship between these two poles and their 
effect on the neoliberal model as a whole. In most cases, current literature analyzes one 
side of the relationship without fully evolving the interaction between the two. 
Furthermore, the resulting effect on the economic system is often taken for granted and 
not evaluated as a function of the state/opposition relationship. This thesis seeks to 
expand upon that shortfall through a comparison of Chile and Argentina.  
Within the first camp of literature, authors focus on the political motivations and 
goals toward economic reform. Opposition action is often taken as one input among 
many for policymaking decisions. Haggard and Kaufman (1992) present an 
institutionalist perspective on economic reform in a broad study of several countries. 
Although the aim of the book is to delve into economic reform processes during 
democratic transition, the lessons can be applied to the introduction and solidification of 
the new economic model. The study shows that during times of economic crisis and 
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social hardship, leaders can use public support to gain the authoritative power to 
circumvent institutional structures that block reform.6 In other words, the leaders can 
carry out reforms in the face of traditional interest groups and opposition parties. This 
viewpoint relies heavily on the autonomy of the state to act accordingly. Consequently, 
the role of opposition is negated, as the state is able to accomplish its task without 
involvement with these groups. Furthermore, the resultant effect on the economic model 
is downplayed. 
A more balanced viewpoint, yet still within the first camp, is provided by Kurt 
Weyland in The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies (2002). He argues 
that democratic leaders decide to pursue risky economic reform during times of crisis and 
gain support for those reforms based on a cost-benefit analysis by all parties involved.7 
The psychological theory presented in the book discusses the choice of people to pursue 
risky options when they find themselves in the domain of losses.8 In other words, they 
choose to accept the hardships of radical economic reforms when the context of the 
upside outweighs the desire to maintain the status quo. To this effect, Weyland is 
speaking to the state/opposition relationship. His theories are extremely useful although 
the portrayal of society is one-dimensional in their choice of yes or no. Thus, the outcome 
of the economic model falls solely on the shoulders of political leadership through policy 
adoption and creating a domain of gains for society. Furthermore, the adjustment of 
neoliberal policies by successive administrations over time is not included in his calculus. 
Scholars that fall into the second camp and focus on the creation and mobilization 
of anti-neoliberal groups similarly fall short of presenting a complete picture. Eduardo 
Silva (2009) offers a detailed look at the reason why contentious action toward neoliberal 
reform has arisen in some Latin American countries and not in others. The foundation for 
his argument relies on the premise that neoliberal reform is the motive for mobilization in 
each country. Other factors—associational space, economic crisis, transformative 
                                                
6 Stephan Haggard, and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International 
Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25. 
7 Kurt G. Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
and Venezuela (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3. 
8 Ibid., 40. 
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mechanisms, and a reformist thrust to major protest movements—predict whether or not 
a movement will materialize.9 Backed up by sound empirical evidence, Silva 
demonstrates that opposition, in certain circumstances, can gain the strength to influence 
political decision-making. These conclusions have significance, to be sure; however, the 
political responses he portrays focus more on social programs that do not have lasting 
implications on the neoliberal model. His study stops short of providing the consequences 
these movements produced on economic reform consolidation.  
Silva does, however, provide a framework for comparative analysis that is quite 
useful for the purposes of this thesis. He looks at the mobilization efforts across several 
Latin American countries and relates them based on capacity.10 In other words, how 
capable is each movement at gaining the power to effect change. This study can employ 
Silva’s framework to expand upon his research and identify the likelihood that an 
opposition movement, in relation to state actions, may disturb the implementation and 
consolidation of neoliberal reform processes and modify the long-term outcomes. 
While the majority of literature falls within the two camps described above, some 
authors have been successful in more thoroughly developing the state/opposition 
relationship in regards to economic reform. Similar to Weyland (2002), Hector Schamis 
(1999) concentrates on the desire of losing interest groups to contend with reform and the 
management of that contention by the reformers to get past the opposition.11 Hector 
Schamis terms these perspectives on the reformer/opposition relationship as “the politics 
of neutralizing the loser.”12 In his study, he takes a different tack by recognizing the role 
collective action can play in policy change. In this framework, the reformers develop 
collective action groups in support of economic liberalization in the form of coalitions. 
By organizing winners, the reformers build their capacity to implement reform and offset 
                                                
9 Eduardo Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge  ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3. 
10Ibid. 
11 Hector E. Schamis, “Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin 
America,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (January 1999): 237. 
12 Ibid. 
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the influence of opposition, or the “politics of empowering the winners.”13 Hence, 
Schamis acknowledges the back-and-forth interaction between government and 
opposition. Sebastian Etchemendy (2001) echoes this coalition-building approach in 
Latin America with a focused study of Argentina.14 Again, the long-term implications of 
this relationship on the economic model across successive administrations is not fully 
developed and left incomplete. 
As stated earlier, opposition groups can come in many forms, have disparate 
goals, and employ several techniques in pursuing those goals. Sidney Tarrow (2011) 
provides an excellent study that takes a look at contentious politics and the relationship 
between the movement and the state. He defines contentious politics as ordinary people 
banding together to confront the national state, authority, or other opponents.15 Groups 
within a nation find a common cause or grievance and are motivated to engage in 
contentious politics. As they grow in strength, social movements evolve in an attempt to 
put a voice to the group’s concerns and effect change. Tarrow’s insight into social 
movements and contentious politics builds a solid working model of the operations of 
opposition. 
James Franklin (2009) presents an interesting discussion on likely government 
responses to contentious politics. He determines that governments can choose any of four 
options toward opposition: give concessions, repress the challenges, tolerate the 
challenges by doing neither, or combine both tactics of concession and repression.16 Each 
choice comes with different costs and benefits in terms of dealing with short-term and 
long-term outcomes. Specifically, these outcomes impact political backlash and future 
challenges. It is in this respect that Franklin’s study provides insight into long-term 
consequences of government response to contentious politics, particularly the resources 
                                                
13 Schamis, “Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform,” 238. 
14 Sebastián Etchemendy, “Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics of Compensations in 
Argentina’s Economic Liberalization,” Latin American Politics and Society 43, no. 3 (October 2001): 1–35. 
15 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed.  
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6. 
16 James C. Franklin, “Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America,” 
Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 4 (December 2009): 701.  
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governments commit to dealing with opposition. Similar to Silva’s work, Franklin’s 
study provides the framework to assess the impact on reform consolidation, making his 
contributions a useful analytical tool for this thesis. 
In sum, the literature discussed above each provides extensive research, solid 
empirical evidence, and valid conclusions for their purposes. Nevertheless, as a whole, 
the current literature leaves a gap with respect to the role of the state/opposition 
relationship on the consolidation of the neoliberal model. More specifically, none 
accounts for the consistency across administrations as a factor on the stability and 
strength of the neoliberal system. To illustrate the effects of consistent actions, the 
following chapters expand on aspects of the works reviewed above in case studies of 
Chile and Argentina. The analysis of these case studies is compared within the final 
chapter and conclusions drawn based on the results. 
 12 
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III. A STUDY OF CHILE 
The aim of this chapter is to piece through the political and economic history of 
Chile since embarking on neoliberal economic reform during the Pinochet era that set the 
stage for decades of positive, sustained growth. Many scholars contend that this would 
not have been possible were it not for the severe repression of reform opposition carried 
out by the dictatorship. This determination is insufficient. Significant oppositional forces 
were present in the form of coalitions and mass mobilizations. Recent literature is starting 
to focus more on alternative forms governmental actions toward opposition to neoliberal 
reform in Chile, and, as I show, Chilean governments have historically used several 
tactics other than repression to manage these challenges. It is the combination of these 
tactics that allowed Chile to cement the neoliberal economic model in Chile and benefit 
from years of economic growth. However, this is not the only necessary factor that 
helped Chile consolidate its neoliberal model. As the current literature fails to appreciate, 
I show that, along with the management of opposition, a government must be consistent 
and stable in its actions and responses toward opposition in order to entrench an 
economic structure. This is a two-dimensional argument. One factor affects the other. 
Chilean governments have been able to use management tactics in a consistent manner to 
keep oppositional influence low. Thus, throughout subsequent changes in government, 
very little variations in the form of the neoliberal structure were introduced, except in 
efforts to change socioeconomic and political inclusion. Growth has been historically 
strong due to this stable economic environment. In the next chapter, I show that 
Argentina was similarly able to implement radical neoliberal reform in the presence of 
coalitions and mass mobilization; however, its inconsistency and instability in 
government actions across time affected the efficacy of its neoliberal model.  
Chile is widely considered the first true test of the neoliberal economic system. In 
1973, a military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet seized control of the government 
from the Salvador Allende administration while in the midst of a harsh economic crisis. 
When the military took over, the nation was ready for change. The primary tasks of the 
new government were to establish their authority and garner the support of the people. 
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Seen as a threat to national security and one of the principal reasons for staging the coup, 
the ailing economy became the government’s foremost project. The decision was made to 
introduce radical neoliberal policies, thereby freeing market forces to get the economy 
back on track. In 1975, the Chilean government under General Pinochet initiated “shock 
therapy” to achieve these goals.17 
With the state of affairs such as they were in 1973, why would Chile decide to 
attempt such radical structural change as that proposed by neoliberal principles? 
Beginning in 1970, Salvador Allende was also taking the Chilean economy in a radical 
direction, albeit in the opposite direction as Pinochet eventually would, giving Chile a 
sort of economic whiplash in a span of five years. The nationalization of productive 
sectors, initiation of widespread price controls, and expropriation of land was driving an 
already weak economy even further toward crisis.18 Chile’s longstanding democracy was 
taking a socialist turn. During the previous few decades, Chile had steadfastly ascribed to 
the import substitution model and protectionism. These tactics soon showed their 
weaknesses as high inflation, unemployment, and unfavorable international market 
pressures stagnated the economy.19 Domestic issues brought on by the crisis coupled with 
international pressures by lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed 
General Pinochet to lean toward a relatively untested economic model.20 
The military government that assumed responsibility immediately realized they 
needed advisement in the matter and relied heavily on technocrats to run the economy.21 
The navy, which was put in charge of the economy, would soon bring in a civilian 
economic team known as the Chicago Boys, named so due to their shared training in the 
Chicago-style of economics. Holding tight to their educational training, this team of 
                                                
17 Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile, Historical Perspectives 
on Modern Economics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20. 
18 Sebastián Edwards, Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger, 1987), 5. 
19 Ibid., 5–6. 
20 Marion Fourcade-­‐‑Gourinchas, and Sarah L. Babb, “The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to 
Neoliberalism in Four Countries,” American Journal of Sociology 108, no. 3 (November 2002): 548. 
21 Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists, 17. 
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economists proposed that only a strict neoliberal structure would restore lasting strength 
to the economy. With the blessing of Pinochet, the Chicago Boys began implementing 
neoliberal reform, following a stringent, almost scientific formula of free market 
mechanisms. Their goal was to firmly impose this radical structure and change the entire 
nature the Chilean political, social, and economic relationship by fostering a long-term 
ideological shift toward acceptance of a free market society.22 
As we dig into the Chilean adoption of neoliberal principles and trace the effects 
of opposition through time, it is useful to divide the historical analysis into four time 
periods. These time periods are based on significant changes in both economic policy and 
regime transition. The first period, running from 1973–1983, is a time of transition into a 
new, radical economic system. During this time, the initial round of neoliberal policies 
were introduced amidst low levels of reform opposition. Some positive growth in GDP 
was experienced, but the expected recovery was not completely realized. Limited 
political liberalization began occurring toward the end of this timeframe. The second time 
period covers from 1983–1989. Over these six years, Chile felt the full brunt of an 
economic crisis that led to a second round of less orthodox economic reforms. The period 
ends with the fall of the military dictatorship and a strengthening economic outlook. 
Encompassing 1990–2010, the third period analyzes the first 20 years of democratic 
government. During this timeframe, the political party coalition, Concertacion, presided 
over four consecutive governments while retaining the neoliberal policy agendas started 
under the dictatorship. GDP growth was stable and positive. Lastly, we will look at Chile 
from 2010 to the present to identify the latest trends in economic growth and opposition 
to the neoliberal structure. Across each of these time periods, consistent responses and 
actions of the government toward reform opposition will allow for the fostering of a 
stable, dependable economic model. 
A. THE CHILEAN NEOLIBERAL TRANSITION 
Levels of opposition to reform have fluctuated through time and across changes in 
government. These movements have occurred in response to and helped shape radical 
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neoliberal reforms that have fundamentally redesigned the economic structure in Chile. 
On this topic, one important point should be discussed. Chile began its neoliberal process 
under the harsh repression of a military government, and then continued it within a more 
forgiving democracy. As many studies not-unjustly contend, one might easily attribute 
Chile’s successful execution of such radical principles to severe repressive tactics that 
silenced all dissention.23 Although the well-documented use of repression against 
challenges to reform is not denied, opposition was still present and able to shape policy 
albeit in limited ways. Therefore, one cannot simply write-off Chile’s successful 
economic model to the context of an authoritarian regime cementing its neoliberal 
structure by forcing its policies on a weak and kowtowed society. 
1. The Initiation Period, 1973–1983 
Following the military coup in 1973 and the decision to move ahead with 
neoliberal reform, the shock therapy of initial policies began in 1975. During this first 
phase, the Chicago Boys, along with other actions, removed nearly all price controls, 
privatized over 400 firms and banks, reduced barriers to trade, cut public employment, 
freed interest rates, and reorganized the labor structure. All of these actions were done 
over the course of a year with the overall goal of greatly reducing government 
involvement in the economy.24 When taking into account the speed with which these 
changes were unleashed on the nation, shock therapy is an apt term. 
Opposition to the new policies of neoliberal principles, although limited during 
this period, came in the form of two groups: winners and losers. The winners were those 
groups that had a lot to gain from an opening international economy. On the other hand, 
the losers were those groups that were at risk of losing their influence, jobs, and even 
their entire business because of greater marketplace competition and trade policies. 
During this period, the clear winners were the business groups that operated in the 
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international sector of the economy, namely banks and financial firms.25 More 
specifically, businesses that were strategically placed to acquire newly privatized firms 
and capitalize on the rapid deregulation of the financial sector.26 As an oppositional 
force, they had a strong motivation to see that the new reforms were carried out quickly 
and in such a way as to benefit them even more. These groups had an advantage during 
the opening stages of neoliberal reform.  
International sector businesses were in a prime position to affect the formation of 
the initial round of reforms in their favor. A few of the international sector businessmen 
and the Chicago Boys had a history of employment together, which the businessmen used 
to gain access to information and participation in early policy formation.27 These 
connections and the nature of their firms allowed international sector businesses to gain 
control of the Chilean market and steer it in a direction that was more radically 
implemented and beneficial to them (Etchemendy, 2011; Silva, 1996). 
Labor and domestic business, most notably those industrial sector groups that 
flourished under the previous import substitution model, were not as fortunate during this 
period. The founding principles of a neoliberal model put these groups at a severe 
disadvantage. Tariffs and other barriers to trade were removed along with price 
controls.28 These policies served to greatly reduce the protection of the import sector and 
introduce greater levels of competition in the market. Businesses that could not challenge 
in their field went bankrupt and folded. In a similar fashion, the labor market was 
liberalized and unions lost significant negotiating influence with employers. One of the 
earliest acts by the Pinochet government was to prohibit any union activities.29 The 
domestic business groups did not enjoy access to the information and policy-making 
contacts like the financial sector groups. Attempts by labor and domestic business to 
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challenge the radical reforms were largely ignored as government processes became 
evermore centralized around Pinochet and his nearest advisors.30 
As forms of opposition, domestic business and labor were largely ineffective. 
Domestic business groups were weak and did not have the influence to make an 
impression. Avenues to express their grievances were almost non-existent for groups 
outside the sphere of influence in the dictatorship. Keeping consistent with the strict 
implementation of the neoliberal market, the Chicago Boys viewed the compensation of 
domestic businesses as a violation of those principles that would introduce inefficiencies 
into the market.31 The market, not the state, was seen as the sole decider of which 
businesses are able to stay and compete and which are to disappear. Thus, at low cost to 
the state and market system, Pinochet was able to ignore complaints from these 
businesses.  
Organized labor was effectively decimated as a source of opposition in this first 
period of economic reforms. Often one of the first actors to mobilize against layoffs and 
downsizing, Chilean labor groups were subjected to harsh repressive tactics and 
legislative controls. The story of top labor leader, Tucapel Jimenez, who was assassinated 
for his opposition to neoliberal policies, is indicative of the repressive environment of the 
late 1970s.32 The privatization of pensions and health services separated workers from 
their benefits and weakened their organization. In an effort to institutionalize this process, 
the 1979 Plan Laboral (Labor Plan) was decreed through a series of laws. The plan 
seemed to have a two-fold effect. First, the combination of these laws and the 
privatization of welfare programs effectively suppressed immediate opposition from this 
group because of the loss of job security. Labor was exposed to market forces, thus 
giving employers the power to fire without cause and offer little to no severance pay in 
certain circumstances.33 Second, the plan slightly opened political space for unions to 
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organize and challenge aspects of the Plan Laboral. Decree laws 2756 and 3355 reversed 
the previous ban on union activity and reestablished four types of union organizations 
with limited protection powers and collective bargaining.34 Although significant gains 
were not made, mining unions were able to begin building support within some political 
parties and elite groups in the early 1980s.35 
Although civil society, represented by the lower class and poor, did not play a 
significant oppositional role during this period, an important process was started that 
would impact the course of economic policy during Chile’s transition to democracy. 
Towards the end of this period, the Pinochet government would decide to undertake 
political liberalization. The reasons for this action are varied. Winn claims that external 
pressure—namely, from the Carter administration in the United States—caused Pinochet 
to back down from severe levels of repression.36 Others suggest that Pinochet wanted to 
gain political support with civil society following the Chacarilla speech and 1980 
constitution (Etchemendy, 2011; Silva, 1996; Silva, 2009). Regardless of the motivations, 
the government sought to ease the effects of market forces on the poor by shifting 
“subsidies and resources away from the middle and working classes in the formal sector 
of the economy to the extreme poor.”37 The Minimum Employment Plan (PEM) and the 
Occupational Program for Heads of Households (POJH) were created as part of a social 
compensation strategy.38 
This period started a trend of consistent actions and responses by the government 
toward certain groups of opposition. Early in the process of neoliberal reforms, the 
government realized it would benefit from the support of capitalist businesses that had a 
vested interest in the neoliberal model. Pinochet decided to allow the coalition of 
financial sector business firms to have access to policy formulation as a way to manage 
their opposition. He simply ignored the domestic industrial business firms that struggled 
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in the new economic environment, offering no compensation to soften the effects of free 
market forces. Labor was subjected to legislative restrictions and utter repression that led 
to the massive fragmentation of organized labor. Finally, with the purpose of gaining 
popular support, the government developed mechanisms for social compensation to ease 
the severity of liberalization targeted at the poor, the unemployed, and informal 
workers.39 These trends of consistency and managing opposition through a variety of 
tactics by incorporating a business coalition for support, marginalizing or repressing 
“outside” business groups and labor, and building a support base with poor civil society 
would provide a stable, almost predictable environment in which Chilean governments 
could instill the neoliberal structure. Even when the government was forced to deviate 
from this recipe, it did so in small, non-destabilizing ways. 
This period ended in economic crisis that changed the power structure of 
opposition and adjusted those groups that had access and influence in policy making. The 
Chicago Boys briefly backtracked to protect their reforms in the midst of the economic 
crisis, thus the door was open for a shift in power among business elites.40 The financial 
sector groups began to feel the squeeze in profitability as exports declined and real 
exchange rates appreciated.41 Political liberalization brought about the easing of 
repressive tactics, the dissolution of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) in 
1980, and the incorporation of the poor. These circumstances set the stage in the next 
period for a substantial shift in economic reforms. 
2. The Adjustment Period, 1983–1989 
After experiencing an uptick in economic growth following the initial round of 
neoliberal policies in the late 1970s, Chile experienced a sharp reversal in the early 1980s 
and fell into economic crisis. Although several other Latin American countries were in a 
similar situation when world prices fell, the cause of the Chilean problems cannot be 
attributed solely to the international environment. Foundational neoliberal principles 
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determine that any intervention by the state would introduce inefficiencies in the 
operation of the free market. This belief, when combined with the strict neoliberal 
implementation plan conducted by the Chicago Boys, caused the economic team to let the 
market correct itself as they expected it would. There were signs as early as 1981 that 
pointed to a potential Chilean economic crisis, but the economists, confident that all the 
proper pieces were in place for the system to recover on its own, held to a strict “do 
nothing” approach.42 The expectations did not materialize as inflation, unemployment, 
and bankruptcies skyrocketed and GDP fell 15 percent.43 Among the groups experiencing 
the full brunt of the crisis were the middle and working classes as layoffs and business 
closings escalated.44 Although some scholars argue that due to their neoliberal policy 
structure Chile was able to recover faster than other Latin American countries, economic 
circumstances had clearly reversed and the political economy felt increased domestic and 
international pressure for adjustment to the neoliberal model.45 
Although the Initiation Period is when the building blocks of the neoliberal model 
were set in Chile, the Adjustment Period from 1983–1989 is when the pragmatic policies 
that would mark Chile as a neoliberal pioneer would be introduced. The long-term 
economic stability that would be generated from this time period is due, in large part, to 
the consistency of the state’s management of oppositional forces that were slowly 
building momentum.  
The neoliberal process also benefited from the way in which the government 
enacted changes during the Adjustment Period. A new direction with respect to economic 
policies was adopted, new oppositional forces gained political influence, and the 
government deepened its strategy of political liberalization. Each of these relatively 
substantial alterations was approached in a gradual, deliberate manner, yet still remained 
largely consistent with actions and procedures from the Initiation Period. Thus, further 
                                                
42 Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists, 27. 
43 Ibid., 28. 
44 Winn, Victims of the Chilean Miracle, 41. 
45 Raphael Bergoeing et al., “A Decade Lost and Found: Mexico and Chile in the 1980s,” Review of 
Economic Dynamics 5, no. 1 (January 2002): 1. 
 22 
destabilization of the tenuous economy during the crisis was avoided and the period 
ended in significant GDP growth. 
The post-crisis period of the 1980s was a turning point for Chile, in terms of 
consolidating a lasting neoliberal economic structure. The Pinochet government was 
scrambling to right the ship in the face of mass mobilization responding to the economic 
crisis. The financial business elites that played such a pivotal role in the Initiation Period 
were losing their influential positions to a coalition of domestic and internationalist 
business factions at the same time that economists and advisors realized that the dogmatic 
approaches to orthodox neoliberal measures were not working and more pragmatic 
policies were needed.46 Opposition that was previously repressed began to test the limits 
of small openings in political space due to political liberalization.47 
The majority of those within the government and in business circles realized that 
a change in economic policy was necessary to bring Chile out of the crisis while 
opposition groups that were experiencing the full effects of the crisis were doing their 
best to ensure the government took action. The Chicago Boys went on the defensive to 
protect their project and guard it from anti-liberal moves. The economist team and most 
of the financial business groups from the Initiation period advocated a continuation of the 
same neoliberal policies. Although Pinochet continued to back the Chicago Boys and 
supported neoliberalism, the financial groups that enjoyed access to policy formation 
were weakened by the events of the crisis and lost their influence.48 
Here is where the consistent actions and management of opposition by the 
Chilean government maintained a certain stability within the state that allowed them to 
strengthen and keep the neoliberal model moving forward. First, a coalition of domestic 
and international businesses that advocated a more pragmatic approach to the economy 
was gaining public momentum as they criticized the government. Similar to the actions 
during the Initiation Period, Pinochet sought support from capitalist groups that were able 
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to promote economic growth. Where the radical financial coalition previously filled this 
role, the government turned to the growing pragmatic coalition. Again, these actions 
managed the opposition directly by bringing them into the fold. Although Pinochet 
allowed small changes to the political structure throughout this period that provided 
greater interaction between the business coalition and the state, he was still able to protect 
policymakers from concerted oppositional pressures by limiting access.49 By staying 
consistent and avoiding drastic modifications, the government was able to navigate 
through and adjust to the circumstances brought on by the crisis without destabilizing the 
neoliberal economic system. 
Labor remained relatively weak in this time period although some groups were 
pressing the limits of political space gained from political liberalization. In response to 
the economic crisis, the working, middle, and, eventually, factions of the upper class 
began to openly demonstrate against Pinochet’s rule and the 1980 constitution.50 
Beginning in May 1983, one day a month became a National Day of Protest when 
demonstrators took to the streets. Nationwide strikes were conducted to demand better 
wages, better working conditions, and, ultimately, the repeal of Plan Laboral.51 These 
anti-neoliberal, anti-Pinochet protests continued until 1986 when the government was 
able regain its control and quell the demonstrations through directed acts of repression 
when the protests became violent. The Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), a 
labor union that coordinated with oppositional political parties, was formed. Although the 
weakened labor unions were unable to secure large concessions or affect economic 
policy, they were able to build a coalition with the Christian Democrats and form an 
influential political party, the Democratic Alliance.52 The state sustained its tactics of 
managing labor opposition through law in the form of Plan Laboral and reduced levels of 
repression. 
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The state continued its political liberalization goals during this period, which 
pertained directly to the role of civil society. As the nation was climbing out of the crisis 
and oppositional political parties were gaining support, the Pinochet government moved 
aggressively toward securing support for the regime by building a popular base with the 
poor. The Democratic Independence Union (UDI) became the formal supporting party for 
the regime and focused its efforts on organizing in the poor areas.53 Taking into account 
the context of the mid-1980s and the growing trend toward a possible democracy, the 
goal of the UDI was to develop networks that would support the goals and policies 
initiated by Pinochet, to include the neoliberal agenda.54 These networks were the only 
outlets available to civil society as a source of opposition. 
In the end, this period ended with Chile reversing the economic crisis and 
achieving high levels of GDP growth. Chile experienced an average growth in GDP of 
over 7.5 percent per year between 1984 and 1989.55 The same oppositional management 
tactics that allowed Chile to initiate the neoliberal policies that ended in crisis enabled the 
government to adjust and return to a strong economy in the Adjustment Period. Clearly, 
these actions were a small, yet important, piece of the recovery process. By maintaining 
control of opposition and portraying stability in the face of crisis, the government was 
able to induce the return of foreign capital, which, along with the rise in copper prices, 
was a reason why Chile was able to recover so quickly relative to other Latin American 
countries. Another reason was the maintenance of certain early reforms in the midst of 
the shift to pragmatic policies.56 
All things equal, this period was integral in the formulation of the Chile that exists 
today. The move toward more pragmatic economic policies provided more flexibility and 
options for the state to make adjustments when it deemed market forces were insufficient. 
Important and influential political parties were created and consolidated that would have 
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a significant impact during the transition to democracy. Neoliberal oppositional groups 
were learning where the institutional roadblocks toward contentious politics lay and in 
what ways the state could be expected to react to challenges. Each of these elements 
provided increasing stability and predictability to the inner workings of Chile. The state 
was consistent in its goals and actions while radical economic alterations were avoided. 
Although the leading group shifted, business coalitions maintained their elite access. 
Labor remained on the margins of affecting policy. Civil society persisted as an agent of 
change rather than an actor.  
3. The Democratic Period, 1990–2010 
The challenge for the Chilean government during this period was to sustain the 
current economic momentum while establishing legitimacy in the regime transition. Prior 
to the popular elections of a democratic government, Pinochet was able to install fairly 
rigid law-based protections to establish a strong political right and institutionalize the 
neoliberal economic structure.57 Any attempt to reverse many of the constitutional 
structures enacted in 1980 required a significant coalitional effort. In terms of economic 
stability, these actions both helped and hurt. On one hand, the flexibility to take necessary 
economic actions for the new democratic government was severely limited. On the other 
hand, conducting massive alterations and disruptions in an already fluid transitional 
period could have major political, economic, and social ramifications, thus the limits on 
state actions could be seen as a positive. As with the Adjustment Period, consistency in 
actions and management of opposition was key to maintaining stable growth. This 
consistency was greatly benefited by the fact that all the democratic governments that 
ruled during this period came from the same coalitional political party, the Concertacion. 
Continuing the trend of the Pinochet government, coalitions of capitalist businesses were 
incorporated into the policy process, labor opposition was marginalized, and civil society 
was targeted for reform in order to establish a support base for the regime and ease the 
effects of market forces. 
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One of the most important decisions made by the first democratic government 
was to hold on to neoliberal principles. Despite the current economic success when the 
Concertacion coalition took office, their previous stance on liberalization left this 
decision in doubt. The Concertacion evolved out of the Democratic Alliance, which 
criticized the government’s neoliberal model during the mass mobilizations of 1983–
1986. The subsequent acceptance and continuation of the pragmatic neoliberal model by 
the Concertacion could be attributed to several factors. Consistent with the earlier 
motivations of the Pinochet government, the Aylwin administration would 
correspondingly seek a capitalist business ally for legitimacy and stability of the 
government’s economic policies. As this support was dependent on the pragmatic 
neoliberal principles that the business coalition fought for against Pinochet, Aylwin 
assured this group the model would not be undone and adjustments would be moderate.58 
The state and capitalist business came to a compromise, just as it did during the Pinochet 
era, in order to diffuse “the historical and ongoing tension between the imperative of 
capital accumulation and the conflicts over socio-political inclusion and distribution.”59 
Again, the government employed the management tactic of incorporating potential 
oppositional business groups into the political process.  
The new democratic governments of this period did not experience increased 
pressure from labor movements when compared to the Adjustment Period. Labor 
organizations were significantly weakened during the Pinochet era and continued to be 
ineffective as an oppositional force. As Silva demonstrates, in the absence of a strong 
labor movement in Chile, other parties and groups organized to fill the empty space. 
Fledgling labor unions were forced to join these groups and play a supporting role to 
promote their grievances. This dynamic gave the state a substantial negotiating advantage 
against an oppositional group that has historically led political movements.60 
Liberalization of the labor market was continued during this period with few changes to 
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the 1979 Plan Laboral or other labor policies.61 Agacino and Madrigal (2003) provide an 
in-depth analysis of the Chilean labor organizations in the 1990s that depicts a severely 
underrepresented group that was non-existent as a viable source of opposition.62  
Where the dictatorship focused on consolidating power and pressing economic 
reform onto the populace, the Concertacion governments pushed to increase political 
inclusion and socioeconomic reforms to help civil society, in particular, deal with some 
of the harshness inherent in neoliberalism. This tactic was aimed at demobilizing sources 
of opposition in the popular sector that were worst affected by the market society created 
under the dictatorship.63 The governments during this period maintained their promises to 
keep the economic structure, but gradually and consistently implemented significant 
socioeconomic reforms within the confines of neoliberal principles. Networks of 
institutions that reached throughout society and provided responsible forums for 
promoting grievances were created in an effort to diffuse tensions that could lead to 
contentious actions. Social programs and subsidies that reduced free market pressures 
were also developed. The Concertacion took every opportunity to remove features left 
from the authoritarian government. 
The key takeaway from these actions was that most forms of opposition during 
this period were actively engaged and softened by the state with the end result of low 
levels of neoliberal opposition. By working toward political inclusion and socioeconomic 
reforms, the government was able to derail sources of opposition at the grassroots level. 
The economy was booming, trade and business was expanding, and civil society was 
enjoying a newfound level of political participation.  
Through the consistency of dealing with opposition, maintaining a unified, 
overarching goal within the Concertacion, and focusing on small, incremental changes 
while retaining the fundamental structure of the pragmatic neoliberal model, Chile was 
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able to fully consolidate neoliberal principles and achieve significant growth during the 
Democratic Period despite significant political and institutional changes introduced by 
the transition to democracy. Little changed in the circumstances of the main sources of 
opposition to neoliberalism represented by business coalitions, labor, and civil society 
during the transition from the dictatorship to democracy. The government was able to 
manage these forms of opposition in a similar fashion as previous periods, thus few 
structural economic modifications were forced to be made and economic stability was 
achieved. Chile was able to adjust failing policies, build upon a solid neoliberal 
foundation, and carve out an economic structure that would work for Chile.  
4. The Current Period, 2010–present 
An economic downturn in 1997 initiated by international events brought a 
temporary end to these rosy times and forced some underlying issues to the surface. Since 
the initiation of neoliberal reforms in 1973, social inequality in Chile has worsened. 
However, with the increase of political participation and interaction with the state in the 
1990s, the population had more freedom and ability to begin voicing their dissatisfaction. 
While GDP growth has returned since the 1997 crisis, protests and demonstrations have 
persisted in the realm of social inequality and, most recently, education reform. 
The consistency and management of opposition by the state that had worked so 
well in the previous decades against business coalitions, labor, and civil society is starting 
to show cracks that new forms of opposition are taking advantage of against 
neoliberalism. As previously discussed, the governments of the Democratic Period had 
focused social spending on the poor to alleviate market pressures and attack the poverty 
problem. In this way, the Concertacion and current governments have attempted to make 
relatively small modifications in education reform aimed at increasing quality and equity 
of schools, teacher pay, and access by all.64 Providing subsidies to make education more 
affordable for all is proving an unsuccessful tactic as protesters desire constitutional 
changes. All things equal, these efforts had the limited effect of only mending the 
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problems and not correcting the underlying education issues cemented by the 1980 
constitution. Although a bill passed by Pinochet just prior to leaving office made 
education reform especially difficult, the current reform efforts by the state are 
insufficient, and opposition is growing.65 
The opposition to the education structure is ultimately getting at the heart of the 
inequality problem and neoliberalism. Chile has some of the best universities in the 
world; however, their private status and high costs have made them only accessible to the 
privileged few. This reinforces the inequality issue. Much of the current beliefs in Chile 
maintain that the government must make some changes to its economic approaches if 
growth is to continue, however, radical shifts in the neoliberal model are not desired.66 
The combination of neoliberalism and the compromise between the state and 
business elites has created a wealthy minority and inequality among the population. 
Business coalitions that have historically worked with the state continue to benefit from 
access to new privatizations while civil society is rewarded with more social programs 
and subsidies. In the meantime, labor continues to struggle to gain wage increases and 
better employment conditions against an institution that is biased toward employers and 
the state. In the Current Period, Chilean GDP growth has shown signs of slowing when 
compared to historic levels. Within this context, it is possible that the reliance on the 
same tactics of opposition management by the state may not be as successful as in the 
past to quell the new forms of opposition to education reform.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Chile is often touted as an economic success story due to its decades long episode 
of sustained, positive growth. This growth has occurred within a neoliberal model that 
has been cultivated by successive governments and accepted by the population as how 
Chile does business. The transition to neoliberalism has not been smooth and was not 
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without opposition to its policies. The state has consistently worked directly with 
capitalist business coalitions capable of creating economic growth to gain support for the 
neoliberal model while giving them access to shape policy. The state has steadily 
weakened labor through labor market reform as called for by neoliberal principles. Even 
during the democratic process when the state had opportunities to reform the labor code 
and bestow greater bargaining powers to unions and labor, the state stayed with its 
historical patterns of management and restrained that potentially powerful source of 
opposition. Finally, the state has remained dedicated to retaining the neoliberal model 
while at the same time easing its effects on civil society through social programs and 
subsidies. These actions have created a stable economic environment that has limited 
uncertainty in order for domestic and international business and investors to thrive. 
However, new forms of opposition desiring education reforms are proving difficult to 
manage using the state’s traditional tactics. As a result, current governments are being 
forced to make deeper adjustments to the economic model, which is showing signs of 
slowing growth. 
As this chapter has shown, the state’s consistency and management tactics in 
dealing with certain sources of opposition to reform has allowed the state to keep the 
economic model intact with mostly minor modifications. In the next chapter, an analysis 
of Argentina, which was also able to institute radical neoliberal reform, shows how 
inconsistency in government actions and policies is a factor in its consolidation of the 
neoliberal model. Argentina has experienced several years of fluctuating growth and 
economic instability.  
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IV. A STUDY OF ARGENTINA 
In this chapter, the development and adjustment of Argentina’s current neoliberal 
economic structure beginning with President Carlos Menem is analyzed through the lens 
of the relationship between the government and opposition to neoliberal reform. 
Following the same general outline and goals of the previous chapter on Chile, the intent 
of this chapter is to demonstrate inconsistencies in successive administration’s dealings 
with anti-neoliberal groups, which were present in varying sources and forms throughout 
this period. These inconsistencies in government actions have negatively impacted the 
consolidation of Argentina’s neoliberal model and assisted in the creation of an uncertain, 
fluid economic system. Since neoliberal reform, Argentina has experienced relatively 
short spurts of GDP growth mixed with reversals. In its current status, it is difficult to 
classify Argentina’s economy as stable. 
Menem’s neoliberal program was not the first attempt by Argentina government 
to install this model; however, it was the only one that was successful in terms of gaining 
relatively lasting accepted by subsequent administrations. Given the country’s rocky 
history with implementing lasting neoliberal reform, several factors account for Menem’s 
push to restructure based on the economic model. At the time when Menem assumed 
office, Argentina was in the midst of an economic crisis and was experiencing extreme 
hyperinflation. Some figures put the level of inflation around 11,000 percent between 
1989 and 1990.67 The economy, in terms of GDP growth, shrank by 7.5 percent in 
1989.68 Part of the impetus for Menem’s neoliberal program might be because, as 
Weyland demonstrates, democratic governments are more willing to pursue risky, 
widespread reforms, and gain support for those reforms, when the country is faced with a 
severe economic crisis.69 Menem was also responding to external pressure from 
international financial groups, such as the IMF and the World Bank that advocated 
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economic adjustment plans.70 Thus, it was time for meaningful change in the way that 
Argentina was conducting its economic business. 
Menem was faced with several challenges in his effort to enact such severe 
economic restructuring. As some scholars discern, opposition groups often have greater 
opportunity to engage in political challenges in democratic regimes than in non-
democratic regimes.71 In Argentina’s democratic environment, Menem would need to 
keep the amount of contentious actions low in order to implement his radical policies. To 
accomplish this task, high levels of public and political support were needed. In addition, 
Menem’s Peronist political party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), was traditionally a 
populist party with a strong support base among the lower and working classes. It was 
entrenched in Argentine society and maintained deep ties with trade unions. As such, the 
PJ was highly critical of the previous administration’s heterodox economic policies, calls 
for privatizations, and weak stance with international financial institutions.72 Thus, 
Menem’s own party was historically, institutionally, and ideologically against the reforms 
he was trying to implement. So he needed to gain support not only from opposition 
political parties but also within his own. Argentina’s historically strong unions, which 
were traditionally politically active and had been nurtured and protected by previous 
Peronist parties, also presented a challenge to neoliberal principles that advocated 
“flexibilization” of the labor market.73 In the face of these challenges, the context of an 
economic crisis coupled with the grim outlook under the current economic structure 
caused Menem to pursue a neoliberal reform agenda.  
Similar to the organization of the previous chapter, analysis of Argentina is 
broken in three time periods. The Reform Period covers 1989–1995, which encompasses 
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the initial round of neoliberal reforms during Menem’s first term in office. During this 
period, Argentina shows signs of recovery from the economic crisis and experiences 
drastic reductions in inflation. Towards the end of the period, opposition to neoliberalism 
begins to build as the pain of the radical reforms starts to transform into another crisis. 
The Crisis Period is from 1995–2003, when Menem is elected to a second term. The 
administrations of De la Rua, Duhalde, and other interim presidents are also encompassed 
in this period. Argentina witnesses its worst economic crisis in the country’s history as 
neoliberal supporters attempt to hold the crumbling economy together. Finally, 2003 to 
present day represents the Backtracking Period as the economy experiences more ups and 
downs as each successive government tinkers with new and old strategies.  
A. THE ARGENTINE NEOLIBERAL TRANSITION 
The role of opposition to neoliberal reform and how the government responded is 
crucial to the level of entrenchment of neoliberalism in Argentina over time. As a 
response to oppositional pressures or to prevent collective action, successive Argentine 
governments, to include the Menem administration, have continually devised new and 
revised old policies to gain political support and reestablish economic growth. While the 
sources of opposition stayed fairly constant throughout this timeframe, the manner in 
which the state had promoted, demoted, appeased, or ignored them to achieve their goals 
was not. As a result, the neoliberal model was in a constant state of change while the 
Argentine economy suffered. The following sections will highlight the relationship of the 
state and neoliberal opposition as it pertains to the neoliberal structure in order to 
illustrate the relationship’s variations over time.  
1. The Reform Period 
President Carlos Menem began the initial round of neoliberal reforms almost 
immediately upon assuming office in 1989. Adhering to an orthodox interpretation of the 
neoliberal model, the administration took steps to reduce barriers to trade, privatize 
nearly all state-owned companies, remove price controls, and drastically downsize the 
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public sector by eliminating thousands of government jobs.74 It also sought to reorganize 
the labor market through wage decreases, limits to collective bargaining, and labor 
contracts that reduced barriers to freer hiring and firing practices by employers. These 
reforms, applied quickly in a form of economic shock therapy, had the immediate 
purpose of bringing inflation under control, stabilizing the currency, and restoring 
confidence in the economy.75 A central feature to Menem’s program was the 
Convertibility Plan of 1991, which locked the value of the peso to the U.S. dollar with a 
one-to-one convertibility. The plan was hugely successful in reducing inflation and 
creating a dependable currency.76 By 1994, inflation was down to three percent annually 
and Argentina experienced four years of positive growth.77 
Menem was able to able to accomplish this feat, in part, by turning potential 
losers from neoliberal policies into winners. First on the list of potential losers were the 
giants of Argentine business. Proposed privatizations under the new economic structure 
proved a threat to their practices. The Law of State Reform put up for privatization 32 out 
of 400 state-owned enterprises with the rest soon to follow. The business sector had 
historically been opposed to privatization because they had been able to extract rents 
from the state by overcharging for public contracts.78 To gain the support of the business 
groups, Menem offered them substantial concessions and discounts in public sales.79 The 
ploy worked as the business sector stopped fighting privatization and purchased the state-
owned enterprises.80 In addition, the success of the Convertibility Plan in ending 
hyperinflation and stabilizing the currency was instrumental in weakening big business as 
a source of opposition to neoliberal reform when money began to flow into the country. 
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Labor was another potential loser that Menem was able to turn into a partial 
winner and supporter of neoliberal reform. In order to pass policies that liberalized the 
labor market, the administration would need to weaken or remove unions as a source of 
opposition. Similar to the management tactics used with the business sector, concessions 
and special dispensations were used to coopt the labor unions. Menem was able to create 
conflict among unions by favoring some while, at the same time, ignoring others. The 
Union of Civil Personnel of the Nation (UPCN), a traditionally Peronist union that 
represented mainly national public employees, was given access to state agency 
restructuring talks and special collective bargaining status in exchange for acceptance of 
some worker downsizing during labor reform.81 By making similar bargains with the 
General Workers Confederation (CGT), Menem was able to subdue a historical source of 
contentious action and protest.82 The Association of State Workers (ATE), a non-Peronist 
union that represented teachers and government health workers, was not given such 
concessions by Menem, who proceeded to make the majority of public employment cuts 
within the education and health systems.83 Uncooperative unions were essentially 
repressed through restructuring, i.e., firing militant leaders, prohibiting strikes in certain 
sectors, and manipulating union elections.84 It was these types of deals that allowed 
Menem to conduct labor reform, but also permitted unions to retain some level of 
associational power. Although some labor unions still had teeth as evidenced by the CGT 
retaining the right to administer private pensions in 1992, the tactics used by Menem to 
weaken labor as a source of opposition led to deep political exclusion and general 
organizational impotence.85 
Lastly, Menem needed to get a coalition of political parties on his side. Showing 
no sign of party loyalty, he again turned to special concessions and political appointments 
to curry favor with both opposition parties and his own. As Levitsky points out, “rather 
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than downplaying the degree to which he was ‘betraying’ Peronist principles, Menem 
publicly embraced the shift, making grand gestures to emphasize his conversion.”86 
Somewhat at odds with the orthodox neoliberal model, yet in support of its consolidation, 
Menem centralized decision-making power around him in order to prevent other 
institutions from countermanding his policies or implementing acts of their own.87 
Therefore, while he was handing out political seats to allies and opponents alike, he was 
gathering power around himself. 
On their own, civil society was not effective in opposing neoliberal reform. The 
majority of the working and lower classes supported the Peronist party and although 
Menem clearly shifted the traditional mechanisms behind the party, the PJ was able to 
maintain a significant support base among civil society. This may be because the average 
citizen did not understand the economic restructuring that was taking place and, 
therefore, did not realize the likely impact to them. Or, as Weyland points out, it is 
possible that the population accepted the highly risky and painful reforms because they 
saw it as the only way of possibly improving their situation.88 Either way, massive 
popular mobilizations did not occur during the initial part of the Reform Period and only 
began to rise when the economy began to sour toward the end of the ’90s. Furthermore, 
Menem gained public support and eased the pain of neoliberal reforms by creating 
several social plans.89 This tactic is another form of visibly handing out concessions in 
return for support, while at the same time bolstering neoliberalism through mechanisms 
that theoretically help the poor work themselves out of poverty. 
This support by civil society does not mean to imply that no mobilizations 
occurred during the early reform years. Weakened labor unions were also seeking to 
establish a support base within civil society in order to oppose neoliberal reforms. 
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Although they were unable to generate substantial momentum or significant gains, some 
unions like the newly founded Argentine Workers Central (CTA) achieved considerable 
backing among the poor and unemployed. They pushed for the return of workers’ rights 
and increased benefits and wages. Their reliance on contentious actions, such as strikes, 
demonstrations, and protests, gained for them even more followers. Although these 
actions remained mainly at the provincial level, some mobilizations such as citywide 
strikes in 1993 gained national media attention.90 
Thus, through granting privileged access, political appointments, and other special 
privileges, Menem was able to gather enough support to liberalize the Argentine 
economy by creating winners among potential losers. Party leaders, union 
representatives, business conglomerates, as well as the majority of the Peronist electorate 
allowed the government to pursue painful economic reform to pull the country out of 
crisis. Little opposition remained. With the stabilization of the currency, laissez faire 
market policies, and offers of shares in privatized companies, international investors 
brought much needed capital back to Argentina. 
Although the IMF and other international financial organizations could not be 
classified as sources of opposition during this period, there is clear evidence that they 
were sources of influence in shaping policy during the Reform Period. Indeed, gaining 
financial backing from these institutions was crucial for Argentina to climb out of the 
economic crisis. Due to its high levels of debt and lack of foreign investment, the country 
did not have the capital to implement the neoliberal reforms on its own.91 Officials from 
the World Bank were directly involved in drafting policy, and receiving loans meant 
meeting conditions set by the IMF.92 During the Mexican financial crisis that spread to 
Argentina in 1995, the IMF supplied loans to help weather the storm and maintain its 
neoliberal policies.93 
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As the Reform Period wound to a close and Menem prepared for another 
presidential term, the Argentine economy had responded fairly well to neoliberal shock 
therapy. Inflation was down, and GDP growth was up. Menem had been able to meet his 
goals of implementing deep neoliberal reform by building strong coalitions of support, 
which was crucial to stabilizing the peso and attracting foreign investment. The 
government was able to turn losers from neoliberalism into winners, thereby short 
circuiting most forms of opposition. Menem was able to gain the cooperation of domestic 
and international business, unions, and political parties through the consistent use of 
privileged access, special favors, and political appointment while marginalizing 
uncooperative opposition groups. 
Two major problems were quietly building during this time period that would 
greatly change the progress of the next period. First, by maintaining his core of 
supporters and excluding others, a strong group of outsiders were gathering to oppose the 
neoliberal model. A majority of these outsiders were union leaders, which were 
organizing in the provinces with social support, and political party leaders, which were 
developing factions and consolidating efforts during election time. Second, the 
Convertibility Plan was successful at reducing inflation, however, a vested interest by all 
parties was created in maintaining a stable currency. Without the plan, the systemic 
predictability provided by a stable currency would be gone, increasing the risk of capital 
flight and a stoppage of foreign investment. The currency stability policy became 
politically entrenched. According to Treisman, “Menem’s tactics were so successful at 
forging consensus on exchange rate stability that, perversely, they helped prepare the 
economic and political crisis of late 2001. Any talk of devaluation became taboo, even 
after a recession began in 1998.”94 
2. The Crisis Period, 1995–2003 
Over the course of this period, the economic and political situation took a turn for 
the worse. The economy slowly weakened toward crisis, and due to several factors, 
Menem’s coalition of support crumbled along with it. First, there was a change in the 
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political environment. Menem made a push for constitutional changes that would allow 
him a third term in office. This decision predictably caused rifts among the leadership of 
the PJ. These tensions attributed to the pronouncement that Congress would not renew 
the president’s omnibus emergency powers, making it more difficult to gain approval for 
further reforms and policy adjustments.95 Also, the Frepaso, a political party formed from 
a PJ faction and allied with the CTA, was able to gain some power and influence by 
winning some electoral seats, which placed them in a position of consequential 
opposition. Second, the recession stemming from the 1995 financial crisis in Mexico had 
applied even more pressure on those in society who were already feeling it from 
neoliberal policies, feeding the spread of discontent and mobilization. It quickly became 
clear which groups were going to stand by Menem and which were going to turn their 
backs. Third, unemployed and informal worker groups that were previously lacking the 
capacity or motivation to mobilize began to organize at the local and regional level.96 
Menem’s efforts in the Reform Period to gain the support Argentine business 
groups continued to pay off as they maintained their backing of the neoliberal model. 
Clearly winners in the new economic landscape, these groups had a vested interest in the 
status quo. Here, again, is where currency stability was key. Argentina’s businesses were 
securing profits through foreign investor’s purchases of shares, which depended on the 
certainty provided by the Convertibility Plan. As a result, these business groups stepped 
in financially to calm the market during the 1995 recession when other groups began to 
withdraw capital.97 
Although Argentina weathered the crisis relatively quickly with the help of the 
IMF, union-led opposition, which was bolstered by the unemployed and poor in civil 
society, grew in strength, frequency, and national recognition. Hunger and daily 
subsistence were real problems at this time in Argentina, and the CTA and Frepaso were 
able to use those worries to gain mass support among the poor, unemployed, and 
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informal, lower-, and middle-class workers.98 Labor and civil society essentially merged 
as anti-neoliberal organizations. Between 1995 and 1999, the CTA organized and led 
growing demonstrations in various forms against the government. Local neighborhood 
groups centered on the unemployed and informal workers induced roadblocks, piquetero 
demonstrations, and town uprisings. However, rarely did national attention or federal 
action take place. Instead, Menem allowed the provincial governments to handle 
negotiations with the contentious groups. The government, however, continued with its 
neoliberal policies and tactics of social exclusion. As an extension of Menem’s tactics of 
concessions, governors and local leaders provided relatively small handouts to the 
protestors, such as workfare, food supplements, and debt relief. Some groups who were 
willing to cooperate received promises for public works programs and long-term 
employment.99 Some scholars contend that the use of workfare plans as a form of 
concession to the unemployed and informal worker groups ultimately helped them 
organize and expand as a future source of opposition.100 While this may be true, it could 
also be interpreted as a success for Menem’s tactics. Getting the opposition to focus on 
and demand relief from a relatively inexpensive social policy diverted the groups from 
challenging bigger neoliberal policies and economic structure. As a result, the 
contentious actors made little progress toward inducing economic reform, but succeeded 
in creating a dense organizational network that brought various worker groups, local 
politicians, and union leaders together in support of an overarching cause. Thus, while 
protecting his neoliberal project in the short term, Menem’s tactic of marginalizing 
uncooperative opposition groups gave them space to unify for future action. 
By the end of his term in 1999, Menem had successfully avoided currency 
devaluation and handed off the problem of the stagnating economy to De la Rua. With 
the help of the CTA and Frepaso, De la Rua won the presidency on a platform that 
offered the possibility for adjustment to the neoliberal model. As a result, mobilization 
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and demonstrations were curtailed in hopes that these reforms would materialize.101 The 
weakening economic landscape coupled with Asian and Brazilian financial crises in 1997 
and 1999, respectively, caused the new administration to cling to methods that had 
worked in the past. In fact, very little in the way of changes to the neoliberal model or the 
governments tactics toward opposition groups took place prior to the culmination of the 
crisis in 2001. Much of this was due to internal conflicts within the ruling party, which 
led to constant debating and little consensus on what to actually do.102 In the end, the 
Convertibility Plan was maintained while further austerity measures such as reducing 
revenue sharing to the provinces were conducted.103 As previously stated, currency 
stabilization was too far ingrained in the political mindset.  
However, the sense that the Convertibility Plan had run its course and devaluation 
of the peso was on the horizon began to appear among those with a vested interest. In 
particular, domestic and international business groups began to decrease investments in 
this uncertain period. Capital flight swelled as revenues declined and the deficit 
increased.104 International lenders, which heretofore had been supporters of Argentina’s 
policies, began to be sources of opposition. Around 2001, the IMF started to portray an 
ideological shift in how they prioritized decisions on assistance. This shift in thinking 
hardened their stance against the types of policy choices made by countries requesting 
finances by requiring strict conditions and fiscal plans prior to approving loans, a sort of 
“toughen-as-you-sink approach” toward Argentina.105 
As Argentina fell into deep economic crisis, the state had little legitimacy or 
governability amidst internal party conflicts and external mobilizations. Over the course 
of two weeks in December 2001 and January 2002, Argentina witnessed five different 
presidents. Massive demonstrations filled the streets of Buenos Aires on December 19–-
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20, 2001, amidst chants of “Out with the politicians!”106 By the end of the day, De la Rua 
had resigned. After three interim presidents were put in place by the legislature, Eduardo 
Duhalde from the PJ took the reins. Faced with high levels of social unrest and a hardline 
IMF, Duhalde devalued the peso by ending convertibility almost immediately upon 
taking office. Capital flight accelerated, foreign investment stopped, arguments over 
dollarized contract renegotiations ensued, and the Argentine economy collapsed. With 
nowhere else to go, Duhalde continued to try to meet IMF demands, and amidst growing 
unrest, announced early presidential elections in 2003.107 With respect to the mobilized 
opposition groups, Duhalde returned to the tactic of concession. In an effort to appease 
the groups and contain discontent, expanded social programs and targeted schemes, such 
as the Unemployed Heads-of-Household Program (UHHP) and food plans.108 The 
administration handed out “hundreds of thousands of six-month work plans to piquetero 
organizations and local Peronist bosses.”109 The slight success of this maneuver to 
dampen the organizations gave the government a little space to focus on regaining 
stability within the government and the economy. 
Staying mostly consistent in dealing with opposition throughout this period, very 
few adjustments to the neoliberal model were forced during the Menem and De la Rua 
administrations. A lasting, consolidated neoliberal model was set in Argentina. To be 
sure, social unrest organized by anti-neoliberal groups and unions grew substantially 
toward the end of this period. However, by the time De la Rua resigned, the government 
had essentially lost legitimacy and governability. Or, as O’Donnell more accurately 
stated in a general discussion of economic crises, “the crisis [led] to the decreasing 
plausibility of the state as an authoritative agent of the country’s interests.”110 Inter- and 
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intra-party conflicts and an impending economic crisis drew all political attention inside 
the government, and instead of the opposition forcing changes to the neoliberal model, 
they forced successive changes in administrations. Ultimately, a center-left government 
would be ushered into the presidency that would pursue mild economic reform.  
3. The Backtracking Period, 2003–Present 
After the Alianza government of Duhalde failed to correct the economy, Nestor 
Kirchner, of the Peronist party, gained the presidency. From the beginning, Kirchner 
would have to struggle to build legitimacy for his administration. Carlos Menem, who ran 
against Kirchner in the 2003 race, withdrew, causing Kirchner to accept the office 
without a majority vote in a run-off and robbing him of its legitimacy. As a result, 
Kirchner took on an agenda that seemed to be aimed at gaining public support. While 
maintaining the fundamental structure of the neoliberal program initiated by Menem, 
Kirchner changed the tactics used to deal with opposition groups, thus weakening the 
strength of the neoliberal model in Argentina. 
The role of unions was pivotal in the neoliberal trajectory during this period. Most 
notably, the strengthening of unions’ organizational and bargaining power allowed by 
Kirchner’s administration is atypical of an orthodox neoliberal model. Neoliberalism 
often portrays unions as “rent-seeking groups that distort the real value of wages and 
general market equilibrium,” which causes liberalizing governments to deregulate the 
labor market and atomize unions.111 However, Kirchner had incentive to seek greater 
support of unions, especially some with anti-liberal leanings, for two reasons. First was to 
quickly gain legitimacy for his administration and ease the protests. More leftist unions 
such as the CTA led many of the largest demonstrations, but the government chose to 
work with the CGT as a more central ideological union.112 Second, Kirchner’s faction of 
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the Peronist party held more tightly to the party’s traditional populist ideology in which 
the government and labor had a stronger connection of mutual support.113  
Predictably, the government’s tactics in dealing with unions was inconsistent with 
earlier administrations, and the Argentine neoliberal model was ultimately weakened. 
Kirchner sought to return more power to the unions by allowing and supporting conflict 
between employers and unions and also reforming the organization of labor. The 
government directly bolstered the union’s bargaining position against employers by 
rarely choosing to invoke “mandatory conciliation” in labor conflicts, which forces the 
two sides to the negotiating table and ends any direct actions in progress.114 A new 
Labour Organization Act in 2004 reduced precarious hiring and firing practices, granting 
greater protection to workers. Also, the government supported a raise in wages through 
the Basic, Vital, and Movable Wage Council in 2006, causing further contract 
negotiations between labor and employers.115 By revitalizing unions across the board in 
this way, Kirchner acted directly counter to the efforts of Menem in the 1990s, whose 
neoliberal reforms trended toward labor flexibilization and easing of hiring and firing 
practices for employers. Where Menem had built his support base in the lower and upper 
classes through the clientelistic distribution of social programs and special concessions, 
Kirchner gathered support in the middle, which was severely impoverished by the 2001 
crisis.116 
Social programs and efforts at social inclusion expanded greatly during this time 
period. The level of social protest was still high at the beginning of this period, and 
unemployment hovered around 17 percent in 2003.117 To diminish the drive of the 
demonstrators—especially unemployed workers’ organizations—and gain their support, 
Kirchner targeted and expanded social programs, like the UHHP, toward meeting some 
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of their demands and easing the pain of the free market system.118 Among other 
programs, the administration created public works projects, housing projects, and 
business start-up subsidies.119 The corresponding increase to social inclusion of the 
middle class helped to demobilize the large majority of opposition groups in sections of 
civil society. As a result, Kirchner was able to build a significant support base among the 
unemployed, union, and middle class groups in order to ease contentious actions and 
legitimize his administration. Both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner would demonstrate a 
vested interest in protecting this support base that would impact their economic decisions 
and ultimately the neoliberal model. 
Relations with domestic and international business steadily worsened over the 
course of both the Nestor and Cristina Kirchner administrations. Following the 
devaluation of the peso by Duhalde in 2001, Nestor Kirchner initiated a monetary policy 
suited to create growth. Also, as previously discussed, the government took actions to 
strengthen the unions’ bargaining power with employers, thereby creating a gradual 
increase in wages over the years. These factors generated an environment for growing 
inflation. Instead of dealing with inflation through monetary policy, the Kirchners used 
price controls and export bans to protect their constituents’ income in civil society.120 
Increasing international prices and domestic demand were leading to a rise in the price of 
consumables. By controlling the price and types of exports, the administration could keep 
domestic prices low. As a result, producers and exporters were severely hurt on their 
bottom line and struggled to compete in the market. Public utility prices were also 
frozen.121 In an environment such as this, production is likely to suffer, which creates 
even higher demand and the need for subsidies, as witnessed in the Argentine energy 
sector.122 
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Over the last few years, Cristina Kirchner has turned to the re-nationalization of 
some private companies. Since foreign investment has been slow to return after the 2001 
crisis and domestic production has been declining amidst export bans and price controls, 
some scholars attribute the nationalization of these countries as an attempt to gain cash 
for domestic spending.123 Others portray the moves not as complete reversal of neoliberal 
privatization, but motivated only in cases where price rate conflicts and market 
conditions could not be resolved.124 In the end, it is clear that the current administration’s 
preference is to guard the incomes of their support base at the cost of alienating domestic 
and international business and investment. The shift in policy and tactics toward 
opposition groups under Nestor Kirchner was greatly supported by an influx of funds 
from an international commodity boom. Cristina Kirchner’s administration has not 
enjoyed such a boom, yet these economic policies remain.125  
The winners and losers in this period are clear. Domestic and international 
business interests are stressed to compete in the current economic policy environment. 
Exporters and utility companies are unable to cover production costs due to price controls 
and export bans. The threat of nationalization has created an uncertain environment and 
scared away sorely needed investors. Unions and civil society, on the other hand, have 
emerged much stronger in the current context. Unions have regained some standing 
through collective bargaining powers and a return of wages. They have also become more 
autonomous from politics and “are no longer central political actors but instead perform 
as agents that provide economic governability while they obtain access to state positions 
and resources.”126 Despite high levels of contentious actions at the beginnings of this 
period, opposition groups of the unemployed and informal workers have found support 
from the unions while gaining both social and political concessions and increased access 
to policy making.127 
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B. CONCLUSION 
Since Carlos Menem first initiated radical neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, 
Argentina has weathered several economic crises, mass mobilizations, and fluctuations in 
economic growth. Throughout this period, the country continued to represent a free 
market system, however, the neoliberal model has been weakened due to inconsistencies 
in the government’s approach to dealing with opposition. More specifically, the 
administrations of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner had pursued the support of opposition 
groups in a different manner than previous administrations, which caused them to 
implement policy reforms that helped those groups and alienated others. These policy 
reforms have tested the boundaries of the neoliberal model in Argentina and deteriorated 
the provision of its underlying principles. 
Consistency in actions toward anti-neoliberal groups reigned in the Reform and 
Crisis Periods. In order to implement neoliberal reform, Menem judiciously used 
concessions, special access, and political appointments to build a support coalition among 
political parties, unions, and domestic and international business. To ease the hardships 
caused by his reforms, he also created social programs targeted at the poor and 
unemployed. The neoliberal model was accepted in Argentina during the Reform Period 
and strong, positive growth was initially achieved. However, due to several factors, the 
economy lost steam in the Crisis Period and severely retracted. Despite challenges from 
within his coalition and among unions and civil society throughout his presidencies, 
Menem stayed consistent in his tactics toward opposition groups. Thus, he was not forced 
to drastically change the form of the neoliberal model. Inter- and intra-party conflict, 
crisis, and mass mobilizations prevented De la Rua from halting the economic crisis. 
Although he was elected under a different coalition than Menem, De la Rua refrained 
from making major reforms of the neoliberal standard and followed Menem’s example by 
employing the same tactics of managing opposition.  
At the end of the Crisis Period and devaluation of the peso by Duhalde, the 
economic and political situation in Argentina had clearly changed. The administrations of 
Nestor and Cristina Kirchner took steps to strengthen unions and include civil society in 
ways previous administrations had avoided. To build a support base and dampen 
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mobilization, Nestor Kirchner facilitated an increase in wages and expansion of social 
programs. He and Cristina Kirchner sought to maintain the needs of this support base at 
the cost of the neoliberal model and in the process alienated domestic and international 
business groups. This desire caused them to implement policies such as price controls and 
nationalizations that diminished the effectiveness of and, in some instances, collided with 
neoliberal principles in Argentina.  
Over the course of Argentina’s neoliberal experiment and its subsequent reforms, 
the country has experienced turbulent fluctuations in economic growth and decline. 
Whether due to multiple economic crises, external pressures, political conflict, or 
domestic troubles, inconsistencies in maintaining a stable neoliberal model surely had an 
amplifying effect on these fluctuations. The fluidity of policies and ever-changing 
economic institutions created an uncertain market environment for all parties involved. 




In the end, both Chile and Argentina were able to institutionalize a neoliberal 
economic standard, however, the degree to which each country was able to generate a 
stable model through policy and consistency varied. Chile’s neoliberal model was able to 
stay relatively stable with few drastic modifications or departures from foundational 
neoliberal principles over the course its construction. Argentina’s neoliberal model has 
regressed in strength of principles and stability over time. As this thesis has shown, the 
way in which governments engage with groups in opposition to neoliberal reform matters 
for the constancy of the economic system. Consistency in tactics matters. Indeed, while 
Chile has been able to maintain relatively positive, sustained growth since introducing 
neoliberal policies, Argentina has experienced fluctuations in economic growth over the 
same time period. 
A. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 
The cases of Chile and Argentina contain some striking similarities in terms of the 
process of neoliberalizing their economies, yet the consolidation of a stable neoliberal 
model and trajectory of economic growth have been drastically different. First, setting 
aside the obvious distinction that Chile began its process under a dictatorship and 
Argentina under democracy, each country followed the same general path toward 
liberalizing their respective economies. Faced with deep economic crises, Pinochet and 
Menem made the drastic choice to enact radical economic reform structures. In 
accordance with neoliberal principles, both countries downsized the state, privatized 
business, eliminated price controls, and liberalized trade and labor as the main thrusts of 
their reforms to open the market. The timing and depth of these processes varied, 
however, both countries instituted their reforms in a short period of time. Also, again 
setting aside the obvious distinction of regime type, both Pinochet and Menem 
consolidated decision-making authority around their inner circle.  
Second, each country highlighted relationships among the same groups of 
potential opposition: domestic and international business, unions, and civil society. In 
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Chile, Pinochet gained the support of dominant business conglomerates that had the 
capacity to affect economic growth while marginalizing those business groups that did 
not. As Chile moved through an economic crisis, Pinochet stayed consistent with this 
tactic even though he changed which business group he favored with policy decision 
access. Union organization and influence was complete destabilized and atomized in 
Chile through strict labor laws and repression. Even as Chile transitioned into democracy, 
unions were never able to gain a significant foothold in collective bargaining power 
because each successive administration kept them on the outskirts of influence. Chilean 
civil society remained dissipated and non-influential as a source of opposition up until the 
last few years. Leaders have stayed fairly consistent throughout Chile’s neoliberal 
program in its management of civil society through social programs targeted at these 
groups and the creation of dense networks for social inclusion.  
In Argentina, governments have focused their efforts on the same groups although 
in less consistent ways. Government courted domestic and international business groups 
through insider access and preferential treatment during the privatizations in the early 
90s. In later years, these same groups were weakened and marginalized by other 
administrations that had different beliefs in how to gain support for their economic 
agenda. Nationalizations occurred in specific instances while the threat of further 
nationalization existed in the atmosphere. Unions were engaged on a circumstantial basis 
throughout Argentina’s neoliberal period. Menem successfully undermined union power 
by causing inter-union conflict via the coopting of some unions and the disregarding of 
others. Overall, the liberalization of unions was achieved, however, as will be discussed 
later, the depth to which this occurred compared to Chile is suspect. Argentine unions 
would regain their organizational autonomy and influence through the actions of later 
administrations. Lastly, the management of civil society in Argentina occurred through 
the use of social programs and concessions. Only when opposition groups in civil society 
joined with unions and disgruntled political leaders did they gain national attention and 
mass mobilization.  
Finally, each country experienced an economic crisis driven by their neoliberal 
policies approximately ten years following the initiation of reforms. Interestingly, both 
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Chilean and Argentine decision makers believed the market would correct the situation 
on its own and neither took direct steps to intervene in the economy in order to divert the 
impending crisis. Following their respective crises, however, each government engaged 
in distinctive responses to pull their countries out of danger. 
Where Chile and Argentina were different in their neoliberal process gets at the 
crux of the problem at hand. Chile was able to adjust its policies while keeping the same 
tactics toward the management of opposition. It is clear that the economy, the neoliberal 
model, and the maintenance of its principles were the primary goals across each 
successive government. Chilean leaders dealt with anti-neoliberal opposition in such a 
way as to diminish the opposition without sacrificing the stability of the economic model. 
In contrast, the Kirchner administrations altered the way in which anti-neoliberal 
opposition was handled when compared to earlier administrations. They changed their 
tactics toward opposition with the priority of maintaining public support instead of 
upholding the neoliberal model. In other words, they were willing to sacrifice neoliberal 
principles in order to preserve support and diminish popular demonstrations. Chile’s 
neoliberal model remained stable, whereas Argentina’s inconsistencies in oppositional 
management tactics caused them to alter economic policy and deteriorate the neoliberal 
model. 
Let’s take a look at these conclusions more closely with specific examples and 
comparisons that support the key arguments provided in this thesis. The biggest disparity 
is evident in the management of unions in each country. According to neoliberal 
advocates, unions create inefficiencies in the market through their rent-seeking and 
distortion of real wage values.128 Therefore, one fundamental goal for any government 
seeking to liberalize their economy should be to atomize unions as impediments to the 
flexibilization of labor. As shown, Chile was not only successful at liberalizing labor 
through the organizational destruction of unions but also continued to suppress the return 
of union influence throughout their neoliberal process. The Argentine story of union 
weight is different. Historical attributes and connections of unions in Argentina made 
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them a more difficult beast to tame, and Menem was required to negotiate aspects of their 
support. Despite these differences, Menem was able to subjugate the organizational 
power of unions—although not to the same extent as Pinochet in Chile—and his 
neoliberal policies were adopted. By contrast, the Kirchners desired political support 
from the unions due to their traditional party beliefs. Their actions in support of unions 
returned influence to this group and directly impacted the flexibilization of labor that 
neoliberalism advocates. Union power restricts the freedoms of business to act 
accordingly in competition within the market system. 
Each country’s relationship with capitalist business also took varying paths that 
affected the neoliberal model. Big business in Chile was coopted from the beginning and 
continued to enjoy a close working relationship with the government. The government 
used strong business groups to encourage market growth and strengthen the Chilean 
economy by providing these groups with political access and influence. In Argentina, on 
the other hand, the Kirchners turned the tables on business groups in order to create an 
environment that protected their popular support base. In areas where previous 
administrations provided domestic and international business with political access and 
fair trade policies, the Kirchners erected barriers to free trade, price controls, and threats 
of nationalization. Again, their economic policies aimed at shielding their constituents 
additionally eroded the neoliberal model. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The neoliberal processes of Chile and Argentina provide exceptional case studies 
for comparison on the effects of an administration’s management of economic reform 
opposition on the form of the neoliberal model. I conclude that the consistency with 
which successive administrations deal with anti-neoliberal groups can have an influential 
effect on the way a country’s neoliberal model progresses and shapes.  
In today’s context of the global market, where countries around the world are 
taking steps to gradually open and close their economies every day, a study such as this 
can be very enlightening. Examples and comparisons that are relevant in the current 
environment can help leaders in their analysis of their own economies and apply lessons 
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learned from the experiences of others. The experiences of Chile and Argentina have 
shown us that forging a lasting national plan or purpose that extends across time or party 
affiliation can greatly affect the trajectory of an economic pathway. A strong neoliberal 
structure is one that fits within the national goals of a country, but also provides stability 
in policies and institutions in order to reduce market uncertainty. As the Argentine case 
has shown, uncertainty can lead to capital flight and diminished investments. The sad 
reality is that Argentina has continued its recent policies along the lines of weakening the 
neoliberal model. These policies have led to further devaluations of the peso and greater 
uncertainty in the market. A country that can achieve a strong neoliberal structure with 
complimentary policies and institutions has the opportunity for positive, sustained 
economic growth. 
This thesis has alluded to a possible connection between a stable neoliberal 
economic structure and positive, sustained growth; however, making a causal relationship 
between the two is beyond the scope of this study. Whether or not the Chilean or 
Argentine neoliberal models, which were shaped out of the actions and policies of each 
government, had a direct effect on their subsequent trajectories of growth cannot be 
answered here. Additional research along these lines is worth further examination and 
would help to define this causal relationship, if it exists.  
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